Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1993

State of Utah v. Jack D. Brocksmith : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Kris C. Leonard; Assistant Attorney General; Attorney for Appellee.
Herm Olsen; Hillyard, Anderson, & Olsen; Attorney for Appellant.
Herm Olsen #2463 Hillyard, Anderson & Olsen 175 East 100 North Logan, UT 84321 Telephone
(801) 752-2610 Attorney for Defendant and Appellant Jack D. Brocksmith
Kris C. Leonard Assistant Attorney General 236 State Capitol Building Room 124 Salt Lake City,
UT 84114
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Utah v. Brocksmith, No. 930146 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1993).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/5018

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
BRIEF
UTAH
DOCUMENT
KFU
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

DOCKFTNO
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 930146-CA
vs.
JACK D. BROCKSMITH,
Defendant/Appellant.

First District Court
No. 921000051
Priority No. 2

APPELLANT JACK BROCKSMITHTS REPLY BRIEF

Appeal from an order of the
First Judicial District Court,
Cache County, State of Utah
The Honorable Gordon J. Low Presiding

Herm Olsen #2463
Hillyard, Anderson & Olsen
175 East 100 North
Logan, UT 84321
Telephone (801) 752-2610
Attorney for Defendant and
Appellant Jack D. Brocksmith
Kris C. Leonard
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol Building
Room 124
Salt Lake City, UT 84114
f^mi

^OlAjf-'Ut

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 930146-CA
vs.
JACK D. BROCKSMITH,
Defendant/Appellant.

First District Court
No. 921000051
Priority No. 2

APPELLANT JACK BROCKSMITHfS REPLY BRIEF

Appeal from an order of the
First Judicial District Court,
Cache County, State of Utah
The Honorable Gordon J. Low Presiding

Herm Olsen #2463
Hillyard, Anderson & Olsen
175 East 100 North
Logan, UT 84321
Telephone (801) 752-2610
Attorney for Defendant and
Appellant Jack D. Brocksmith
Kris C. Leonard
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol Building
Room 124
Salt Lake City, UT 84114

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

STANDARD OF REVIEW

1

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

1

ARGUMENT

2

POINT I
A.

B.

C.

WHILE A PRISONER MAY TEMPORARILY WAIVE SOME
OF HIS RIGHTS UNDER THE IAD, SUCH WAIVERS
ARE FOR SPECIFIC AND LIMITED TIME PERIODS
.
THE BURDEN OF SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH
THE TERMS OF THE IAD IS ON THE APPELLEE
RECEIVING STATE

A.
B.

THE STATE VIOLATED THE IAD ART. Ill
DEFENDANT WAS NOT BROUGHT TO TRIAL IN A
TIMELY FASHION
APPELLEE ATTRIBUTES AN EXAGGERATED AMOUNT OF
TIME TO DEFENDANT
1.

2.

CONCLUSION

2

3

DEFENDANT DID NOT WAIVE HIS IAD
RIGHTS UNDER ART. IV

POINT II

.

5
13
13
17

ONLY MOTIONS TO CONTINUE, GRANTED IN
COMPLIANCE WITH FIVE REQUIREMENTS OF
ART. IV(C), TOLL THE IAD CLOCK . . . .

17

DELAYS DURING THE ARTICLE III PERIOD
ARE IMPROPERLY ATTRIBUTED TO
DEFENDANT

18
23

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES CITED
Page
Crosland v. State, 857 P.2d 943 (Utah 1993)
Fex v. Michigan,

U.S.

14,16,20

, 113 S.Ct. 1085 (1993)

. 15

Gray v. Benson, 608 F.2d 825 (10th Cir. 1979) . . . .

2

Hearn v. State, 642 P.2d 757 (Utah 1982)

1,5,9,10

Reed v. Farlev,

4,5

U.S.

, 114 S.Ct. 2291 (1994) . .

State v. Petersen, 810 P.2d 421 (Utah 1991)

1,17,19,22

State v. Phathammavong, 860 P.2d 1001 (Utah App. 1993) 3,12,17,23
State v. Stillings, 709 P.2d 348 (Utah 1985)

....

3,7,8,18,23

State v. Velasguez, 641 P.2d 115 (Utah 1982)

....

3

U.S. v. Dixon, 592 F.2d 329 (6th Cir. 1979)

1

U.S. v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340 (1978)

2,14

Yellen v. Cooper, 828 F.2d 1471 (10th Cir. 1987)

. . 2

State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 769, 788 (Utah App. Year). 8
Birdwell v. Skeen, 983 f2d 1332 (5th Cir. 1993)

. . .1,8,17,18,23

STATUTES
Page
Interstate Agreement on Detainers,
Utah Code Ann. s. 77-29-1 et seg. (1990) . . . .

-ii-

14

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Appellant challenges trial court's interpretation
of section 79-29-1. U. C. A. (1990).

The appellate

court will review de novo questions of statutory
interpretation for correctness without giving deference
to the trial court's interpretations.

State v.

Petersen, 810 P.2d 421, 425 (Utah 1991); Birdwell v.
Skeen, 983 f2d 1332, 1336 (5th Cir. 1993).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act (IAD) is
intended to remedy hardships resulting from the use of
detainers and to eliminate potential abuses of the
detainer system.

United States v. Dixon, 592 F.2d 329

(6th Cir. 1979).

The law states that "[T]his agreement

shall be liberally construed so as to effectuate its
purposes."

U.C.A. 77-29-5 Article IX (1994).

The

Interstate Agreement on Detainers is held to standards
of substantial compliance with the terms of the
agreement and fundamental fairness in the overall
result.

Hearn v. State, 642 P.2d 757 (Utah 1982).

ARGUMENT
POINT I
A. While A Prisoner May Temporarily Waive Some of
His Rights under the IAD, Such Waivers are for Specific
and Limited Time Periods.
A prisoner's IAD rights may be waived for good
cause.

Gray v. Benson 608 F.2d 825 (10th Cir. 1979).

Yellen v. Cooper, 828 F.2d 1471 (10th Cir. 1987).
Failure to invoke Interstate Agreement on Detainers
time limit in a speedy trial motion is not a waiver.
United State v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 151 (1978).
Waiver of IAD rights is a threshold issue in this
case.

Appellee points out that authorities are split

on this matter.

Brief of Appellee 13.

Waiver of

rights is not mentioned in the language of the IAD
itself. U.C.A. 77-29-5, et sea. (1994) .

Since

eliminating obstruction to "programs of prisoner
treatment and rehabilitation" comprises the purpose of
the IAD, allowing any and all waivers would not be in
keeping with the spirit of the law. U.C.A. 77-2 9-5 Art.
I.

Any continuances granted by the court must strictly

comply with the provisions of the Act itself (Art. IV
(c) .
-2-

Case law precedent provides that if a defendant
requests a delay, the defendant cannot assert that time
as grounds for dismissal.
348 (Utah 1985).

State v. Stillinqs, 709 P.2d

Continuances requested by defendant

"temporarily waive[d] his right to a speedy trial."
State v. Phathammavonq, 860 P.2d 1001 (Utah App. 1993).
Appellee advances the argument that one may entirely
waive IAD rights.

Brief of Appellee 13-16.

However,

waivers are much more specific and narrow, applying
only to reasonable periods of time granted for good
cause, and rights are waived only temporarily.

Id.;

State v. Stillinqs, 709 P.2d 348, 349 (Utah 1985);
State v. Velasquez, 641 P.2d 115, 116 (Utah 1982), and
Art. Ill(a) and Art. IV(c).

In this instance,

Brocksmith's waivers were not specific as to time
waived, periodically ambiguous, and insufficient under
the law to apply.

B.

See discussion on pp. 5-13, infra.

The Burden of Substantial Compliance with the

Terms of the IAD is on the Appellee Receiving State.
The language in the IAD compels the conclusion
that the legislature intended to place the burden of
compliance with the statute on the State.
-3-

U.C.A.

77-29-1(4).

The statute reads: "If the court finds

that the failure of the prosecuting attorney to have
the matter heard within the time required is not
supported by good cause, whether a previous motion for
continuance was made or not, the court shall order the
matter dismissed with prejudice." Id.
Justice Blackmun, in a recent dissent addressing
the issue of waiver of IAD rights alluded to but not
ruled upon by the plurality states:
[T]he IAD itself does not require dismissal
for a violation of its 120-day limit only "upon
motion of the defendant," much less "upon
defendant's timely oral objection to the
setting of the trial date." Instead, the statute
unambiguously directs courts to dismiss charges
when the time limits are breached. This arguably
puts the responsibility on courts and states to
police the applicable time limits.
Reed v. Farley,

U.S.

, 114 S. Ct. 2291 (1994)

(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
The IAD similarly speaks to the duty of state
agencies to cooperate.

U.C.A. 77-29-7 (1994).

The

Attorney General is the central administrator of and
information agent for the agreement on detainers.
U.C.A. 77-29-11 (1994).

The Attorney General shall

provide information necessary to the effective
operation of the agreement.
(1994).
-4-

U.C.A. 77-29-5 Art. VII

This is consistent with the views of Justice
Blackmun on this issue, who states: "[T]his is a
reasonable choice for Congress to make.

Judges and

prosecutors are players who can be expected to know the
IAD's straightforward requirements and to make a simple
time calculation at the outset of the proceedings
against a transferred defendant."

Reed, 114 S. Ct.

2291 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).

C.

Defendant did not waive his IAD rights under

Art. IV.
Appellee claims that appellant Brocksmith waived
his rights under the IAD.

Brief of Appellee 15. The

first alleged waiver ostensibly occurred on 11 May
1992.

Appellee proffers a minute entry supporting this

conclusion.

This entry ambiguously states: " —

DEFENDANT WAIVES TIME—"; the document is unsigned and
the IAD is not mentioned, and no "good cause" is
recited.

(R. 236). Considering appellant's numerous

previous references to his IAD rights, the court's
ambiguity does not meet the requisite fundamental
fairness test for a valid waiver.
(Utah 1982).

Hearn, 642 P.2d 757

More importantly, it violates Art. IV(c)
-5-

of IAD by failing to comply with the five prerequisites
cited:

"In respect to any proceeding made possible by

this article, trial shall be commenced within one
hundred twenty days of the arrival of the prisoner in
the receiving state, but for good cause shown in open
court, the prisoner or his counsel being present, the
court having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any
necessary or reasonable continuance."

Art. IV(c).

While it is true that courts traditionally enjoy
wide discretion in granting or denying continuances,
continuances under IAD are unique and specific. Art.
IV(c) establishes five distinct requirements to
legitimize a continuance which would toll the 120 days
of Art. IV.

They are:

(1) the court must have

competent jurisdiction; (2) the grant of continuance
must be in open court; (3) the prisoner or his attorney
must be present; (4) the movant must demonstrate good
cause, and (5) the length of the continuance must be
reasonable or necessary.

These strict requirements are

"indubitably a reflection of the signatory states'
great concern with the harmful effects caused by
detainers."

See Thomas R. Clark, The Effect of

Violations of The IAD on Subject Matter Jurisdiction,
-6-

54 fordham L.R. 1209 (1986).
Read the Minute Entry of May 11, 1992 upon which
Appellee relies.

"Motion to Dismiss has been filed and

State has not responded yet —

court states that a

Motion for Speedy Trial is not applicable."
the good cause?

Where is

If any cause at all can be identified,

it is because the State has failed to timely respond to
Brocksmith's Motion to Dismiss originally filed in
1990, renewed in March of 1991 and renewed yet again on
February 24, 1992. And for that, the State wants to
charge these days to defendant!
Let the record be clear on this point:

Defendant

acknowledges the temporary tolling of time pursuant to
his own motions for extensions of time which might
otherwise have delayed a trial date if the court
complies with Art. IV(c).
(Utah 1985).

Stillinqs, 709 P.2d 348

On 11 May 1992 an arraignment occurred in

District Court wherein a four-day jury trial was set to
begin on 7 July 1992. Record 370.

The minute entry is

unclear on this point in that it states:
WAIVES TIME" after also saying that:

"DEFENDANT

"COURT STATES A

MOTION FOR A SPEEDY TRIAL IS NOT APPLICABLE."

Id.

court erred by ruling that Brocksmith's right to a
-7-

The

speedy trial was null, void, and somehow "not
applicable".

Furthermore, the court failed to comply

with Art. IV(c).
The minute entry is signed by no one, the IAD is
not mentioned, and the only cause for the continuance
appears to be the allowance for the State to file a
response to the defendant's Motion to Dismiss.
Appellee wants this court to presume that this and
other waivers " . . .

encompassed both his

constitutional and his statutory speedy trial rights
where there is nothing in the record to the contrary."
Brief of Appellee 16 f.n. 7.

Appellee then cites as

authority for its urging this court to presume a waiver
of rights State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 769, 788 (Utah
App. Ct. 19). Harrison does not in fact stand for such
a presumption at all.

Mr. Brocksmith suggests that it

is a constitutionally infirm presumption to waive
rights on crucial matters such as speedy trial and IAD
provisions.

Stillincrs, 709 P.2d 348 (Utah 1985),

Birdwell v. Skeen, 983 f2d 1332, 1340, (5th Cir. 1993).
As mentioned, the 11 May 1992 minute entry creates
ambiguity by previously stating: "COURT STATES THAT A
MOTION FOR A SPEEDY TRIAL IS NOT APPLICABLE."
-8-

What

does this mean?

It is either an incorrect ruling which

induced Brocksmith to temporarily waive his IAD time,
or it is a clearly erroneous and highly prejudicial
conclusion by the court that Brocksmith's
constitutional speedy trial and IAD rights are somehow
suspended.

Regardless of which conclusion one chooses,

the fundamental fairness standard required under
precedent was violated.
1982).

Hearn, 642 P.2d 757 (Utah

Brocksmith's "waiver" of time in this instance

cannot fairly be attributed to him.
The second alleged waiver is an equally dubious
citation to an 8 June 1992 court minute entry which
reads:

" — D E F E N D A N T WAIVES HIS SPEEDY TRIAL T I M E — " .

(R. 376). This waiver may be based on the 11 May 1992
erroneous court ruling mentioned immediately above.
Again, no signatures appear, the IAD is not
specifically mentioned, and that court then grants a
continuance for 127 days, neither reasonable nor
necessary.
U.C.A. 77-29-1(4) suggests that unlike here, a
continuance cannot be open-ended:

"In the event the

charge is not brought to trial within 120 days, or
within such continuance as has been granted," sanctions
-9-

provided for shall apply, i.e. dismissal of the charges
(emphasis added).

The fundamental fairness standard

required by Hearn and the incompatibility of open-ended
extensions with purpose of IAD recited in Birdwell
compels the court to set closed-ended trial settings
within reasonable periods of time to effectuate the
underlying protections of the IAD.

Id.

Open-ended

continuances similar to that granted in this instance
would appear to violate the beneficial purposes recited
in Article I of the IAD.

U.C.A. 77-29-5 Art. I.

Consequently, Appellant should be chargeable with only
a reasonable amount of time growing from his
continuance, that is, no more than 30 days beyond the 7
July 1992 trial setting, as opposed to what ultimately
was a 127 day delay in re-setting the matter for trial.
Appellant suggests that under Art. IV(c), he
cannot be said to have temporarily waived his speedy
trial or Art. IV time.

But in any event, any waiver

was for a reasonable but not indeterminate period of
time.

The State wrongfully suggests to this court that

such a waiver lasted from 8 June 1992 until 13 January
1993, a period of 219 days.

Brief of Appellee 39-40.

Defendant suggests that any alleged waiver of a speedy
-10-

trial on 8 June 1992 was not an open-ended allowance
for the prosecutor or the court to extend the time in
perpetuity, especially since Mr. Brocksmith was
incarcerated in Utah the entire time and denied the
benefits of the rehabilitative program otherwise
offered.

No more than 30 days should be attributed to

Mr. Brocksmith, since no specific IAD waiver occurred
on 8 June 1992.
The third court minute entry relied on by
appellee, dated 13 October 1992, states: "—DEFENDANT
WAIVES INTERSTATE AGREEMENT TIME".

appear.

No signatures

The second requirement under Art. IV(c) is

that the continuance must be in open court.
not appear to have occurred.

This does

No such motion is

referenced and no such motion is granted.

The fourth

criteria also appears deficient, in that no good cause
is recited by a movant for a continuance.

Trial was

set two days later for October 26, 1992, so obviously
no continuance was granted.

Even if deemed a valid

waiver by the court, this is a temporary waiver of IAD
rights granted for good cause for a reasonable period
of time.

Phathammavong, 860 P.2d 1001 (Utah App.

1993).
-11-

The final documentation of appellant's alleged
waiver of IAD rights directly states said rights were
waived.

However, the document is a result of the

county attorney's request for a written record of the 9
November 1992 motion hearing.

The document was drafted

by the Cache County Attorney and appears to comply with
four of the five requirements of Art. IV(c).

It fails

on criteria five, the provision which requires that the
length of the continuance be reasonable and necessary.
The trial setting went from November 18, 1992 to
January 13, 1993, a period of 56 days.

Such a lengthy

extension is neither reasonable or necessary,
especially in light of the fact that the Utah Supreme
Court denied Brocksmith's interlocutory appeal on
November 20, 1992 (see record 733). Record 681-2, 7347.

This waiver, if deemed valid by this court, is also

a temporary waiver of IAD rights. Phathammavong, 860
P.2d 1001 (Utah App. 1993).
But the question this court must ask itself is:
"What happened to the October 26, 1992 trial setting?"
Extension #3 (dated October 13, 1992) and relied on by
State, is a minute entry which states:
JURY TRIAL IS TO BE SET SOON."
-12-

"A THREE DAY

Record 579.

That jury trial was set two days later to begin on
October 26, 1992. No motion to continue that new trial
setting is produced by the State, no minute entry is
offered, no documentation of any kind which even
remotely satisfies the mandatory requirements of Art.
IV(c).

In short, none of the time between October 26,

1992 and November 18, 1992 can be attributed to
Appellant.
There is in the record no verifiable and
intentional waiver of appellant's IAD rights arising
from the first two waivers relied on by the State.
Under IAD Article IV, the State must try the defendant
within 120 days.

Even if the court attributes

defendant with continuance numbers 3 & 4, in spite of
their deficiencies detailed in Art. IV(c), 328 days
still passed from his entry into the state to his
trial.

At least 212 of the 328 days must be counted

against the State under Art. IV.

POINT II
THE STATE VIOLATED THE IAD ART. Ill
A. Defendant was not Brought to Trial in a Timely
Fashion.
-13-

The IAD's purpose is to expeditiously dispose of
charges outstanding against a prisoner and to resolve
detainers based on untried indictments/ informations or
complaints. U.C.A. 77-29-1 (1994).

The IAD delineates

the necessary procedure, which begins only after a
detainer has been "filed with the custodial (sending)
State by another State (receiving) having untried
charges pending against the prisoner; to obtain
temporary custody the receiving State must also file an
appropriate request with the sending State."
436 U. S. at 343-44.

Mauro,

Custodial officials must then

notify the prisoner of the detainer.

U.C.A. 77-29-5

Art. Ill(c).
The prisoner can trigger the IAD protections by
filing a written request for disposition of the
detainer charges with the custodial official.
77-29-5 (1994).

U.C.A.

The IAD requires that the custodial

official forward the request for disposition to the
court and the prosecutor in the receiving state.
Crosland v. State, 857 P.2d 943, 945 (Utah 1993).

Upon

receiving the request the receiving state must bring
the prisoner to trial within 180 days.
Ill(a).
-14-

IAD art.

Utah lodged an official detainer against appellant
on 26 June 1991. Brief of Appellee 5.

Appellant

contends that this detainer was actually the third
detainer filed by the State, and the IAD requirements
triggering a 180-day time limit for prosecution had
been met on the date of Appellant's entry into his term
of imprisonment, 4 June 1991. Appellant's brief, p.
9.1

IAD Article IV allows a defendant 30 days to

challenge his transfer to the receiving state, which 30
days Brocksmith utilized.

Brief of Appellant 9-10.

This statutory review exercised by Appellant, from 25
July 1991 to 24 August 1991, should not be counted
1

On 3 April 1990, a Special Agent for the Utah Attorney
General's Office sent a certified felony warrant of arrest and a
letter to the Mercer County (111.) Sheriff requesting that Mercer
County hold Brocksmith [the Defendant] for Utah authorities when
Illinois state and federal proceedings were complete. (R. 519,
586). On 2 August 1990, the Utah Attorney General's Office again
sent a certified copy of a felony warrant of arrest and a letter
to the United States Marshal in Springfield, Illinois,
requesting: "you hold Brocksmith [Defendant] for Utah authorities
when Illinois federal criminal proceedings are finished. (R.
166, 399). Both requests are arguably detainers, which are
defined as "a request filed by a criminal justice agency with the
institution in which a prisoner is incarcerated, asking that the
prisoner be held for the agency, or that the agency be advised
when the prisoner's release is imminent." Fex v. Michigan,
U.S.
, 113 S.Ct. 1085 (1993).
If the requests by Utah officials that Defendant be detained
are held to be detainers under the IAD, then delivery of notice
to the court and the prosecutor of Defendant's desire to have his
charges resolved per the IAD triggers the 180 day clock no later
than 4 June 1991.
-15-

against defendant since it is demonstrably incorporated
into the legislation by virtue of the longer period of
time granted to the receiving state under Article III
vis-a-vis Article IV. U.C.A. 77-29-5 Articles III and
IV (1990).

It is presumably part of the differential

between the 180 days of Art. Ill and the 120 days of
Art. IV.
Appellee maintains that appellant never properly
notified Utah authorities of his intention to exercise
his IAD rights, and hence should be denied the IAD
protections which are otherwise rightfully his. Brief
of Appellee 25-7. But Utah authorities had de facto
notice of appellant's multiple written invocations of
IAD rights.

See 7 February 1990 demand for final

disposition (Record 308);

Motion to Dismiss of 24

February 1992 (Record 105-25);

26 March 1992 hearing

by Utah District Court on defendant's Request for Final
Disposition (Record 248, 314, 340, 341, and 498);
Motion to Dismiss of 1 May 1992 (Record 211-34);
Motion for Declaration of Invalidity dated 2_ August
1992 (Record 591-611); and Interlocutory Appeal dated
26 October 1992 (Record 669).

That is adequate.

Crosland v. State, 857 P.2d 943, 947 (Utah 1993) (Howe,
-16-

C.J., concurring, Stewart and Zimmerman, JJ., joining
in the concurrence), would place the burden on the
prosecution to bring appellant to trial in the
requisite 180-day time period when cle facto notice had
been received.

B.

Appellee Attributes an Exaggerated Amount of

Time to Defendant.
1.

Only Motions to Continue, granted in

compliance with five reguirements of Art. IV(c). Toll
the IAD Clock.
Appellant requests that this court review the
trial court's granting of continuances to determine
whether they were reasonable and for good cause.
Petersen, 810 P.2d 421, 425 (Utah 1991).

See

Motions other

than motions to continue, such as motions to dismiss,
are not attributable to defendant.

Stillings, 770 P.2d

137 (Utah 1989); Birdwell vs. Skeen, 983 f2d 1332 (5th
Cir. 1993).

Motions must be dealt with in an

expeditious manner by the court.

Phathammavong, 860

P.2d 1001, 1004 (Utah App. 1993); U.C.A. 77-29-5 Art. I
(1990) .
Appellee contends that time attributable to
-17-

defendant's dilatory tactics adds up to 505 days, and
that defendant's trial therefore began within the IAD
time limit.

Brief of Appellee 40. While delays

attributable to continuances requested by the defendant
do toll the IAD time constrictions, non-continuance
procedural motions, such as motions to dismiss, do not
toll the IAD time clock. Stillinqs, 770 P.2d 137 (Utah
1985); Birdwell, ibid.

The State has inflated time

attributable to the defendant.

Brief of Appellee 39-

40.
Of the 565 days from the State's filing of its
third detainer to the date of trial, 116 are arguably
attributable to defendant.

That leaves 44 9 days under

both Art. Ill and Art. IV that the State failed in its
burden to bring defendant to trial.

2.

Delays During the Article III Period are

Improperly Attributed to Defendant.
In an apparent attempt to cover its administrative
incompetence in executing its duty under the IAD, the
State argues that " . . . Defendant's efforts to resist
extradition delayed Utah's ability to comply with
Article III . . .."

Brief of Appellee 38. But it is
-18-

the State's burden, not Mr. Brocksmith's, to comply
with the time frames established under the IAD.
Petersen, 810 P.2d 421 (Utah 1991).
The State fails to explain why it took 237 days
after it filed its request for temporary custody to get
Mr. Brocksmith to Utah.

The State has failed to

produce a single document filed by Mr. Brocksmith in a
court of competent jurisdiction which actually hindered
the State from its statutory obligation.

The State has

failed to produce even a single document which would
arise to a legal basis for the court to have prevented
extradition.

The State has failed to produce even a

single document which would constitute a legal
impediment to the State's efforts to return Mr.
Brocksmith to Utah.
Of course Mr. Brocksmith did not want to return to
Utah.

He told Utah he did not voluntarily want to go

in a letter dated 7 July 1991, to the Assistant
Attorney General for the State of Utah, copied to the
Cache County Attorney:

-19-

"Dear Sir: Please be advised that this is "NOT" a
request for final disposition of the aforementioned
[sic] matter, and that I will contest any trancefer
[sic] to your jurisdiction as being a violation of my
rights."
"The record will reveal that my IAD rights have
been violated, and the serious issue of Speedy Trial
raised on the Federal level, but that within the
charges themselves another clear violation of a
Constitutional Right has been violated. Suffice it to
say, I am aware of my rights and will zealously pursue
them. Sincerely, Jack Brocksmith." Record 332.
Why did he write such a letter?

Because he

obviously believed Utah had already violated his IAD
protections, and he did not want to waive the IAD
benefits by validating the State's prior misconduct
with his acquiescence and consent.
But that very letter puts Utah on notice of his
reliance of the provisions of IAD —
abandonment of its provisions.

not his

It was de facto notice

of his reliance on the IAD to the very prosecutors who
then dallied another 227 days before finally getting
him to Utah.

Crosland, 857 P.2d 943 (Utah 1993).

The State's argument suggests that defendant's
letter so cowed the Utah authorities that his letter
alone paralyzed the State's efforts to return him to
Utah until 19 February 1992.
Appellee concedes 589 days between 4 June 1991
-20-

through 13 January 1993. Brief of Appellee 39. It
then mistakenly attributes 228 days of delay to Mr.
Brocksmith between the July 7, 1991 letter cited above
and his return to Utah.

No legal citation for this

attribution is provided.

Brocksmith contends that

under the language of the IAD, zero (0) days are
attributable to him between the detainer and his return
to Utah.

IAD Article III (a) provides that the

appropriate court of the prosecuting officer's
jurisdiction " . . . may grant any necessary or
reasonable continuance" —

but only if good cause is

shown and the prisoner or his counsel are present for
the continuance.

U.C.A. 77-29-5 Art. Ill (a).

showing has been made by the State.

No such

It failed to even

once comply or attempt to comply with the strict and
specific requirements of Art. Ill (a), which
requirements constitute the only way under the statute
to toll the running of the 180 days.
Defendant challenges the State to produce evidence
of its efforts to toll even one single day from the 260
days between 4 June 1991, when he entered upon his term
of imprisonment, and 19 February 1992, when he returned
to Utah.

Even one.

The State cannot.
-21-

And whose

burden is it to initiate the tolling of the time?
is the State's burden.
1991);

It

Petersen, 810 P.2d 421 (Utah

U.C.A. 77-29-5 Art. 1(4).

IAD Article IV(a) creates a thirty day period for
the governor of the sending state to disapprove the
request for temporary custody or availability, "either
upon his own motion or upon motion of the prisoner."
U. C. A. 77-29-5 Art. IV(a) (1990).

If the court

decides to count the thirty day review against the
Appellant, Appellant would have this court use the 24
August 1991 expiration date of the review period as the
date to start the clock against the Utah prosecution.
The State thereafter attributes an additional 39
days as waived by defendant from 24 February to 2 April
1992 because he filed a Motion to Dismiss.

Where under

the language of the IAD does it suggest that the filing
of a Motion to Dismiss constitutes a tolling of the
time provisions under either Article III or Article IV?
The State provides no authority, but rather ignores its
own duty to have sought a Motion for Continuance based
upon any alleged delay caused by defendant's Motion to
Dismiss.

The State failed to do so, and cannot now

take advantage retroactively of its own lack of
-22-

diligence.
In fairness to the State, it is unlikely that the
court would have tolled the time period in any event
because none of the motions save the Motions for
Continuance would have necessarily delayed the trial
settings.
Cir. 1993).

See Birdwell v. Skeen, 983 f.2d 1332 (5th
In fact, the time is chargeable against

the defendant only when his motions necessarily delay
trial.

Stillincrs, 709 p.2d 348 (Utah

1985);Phathammavong, 860 P.2d 1001 (Utah App. 1993).
The State makes no argument that defendant's Motion to
Dismiss on 24 February 1992 delayed his trial or
somehow prejudiced the ability of the State to seek a
trial within the IAD time limits,

CONCLUSION

Charges were filed against Mr. Brocksmith on
December 21, 1989.

On October 31, 1989, he invoked the

speedy trial rights afforded by the Constitution.

On

February 7, 1990, he sought disposition of charges
under IAD.

237 days elapsed between the filing of the

State's third detainer and his return to Utah.
-23-

Defendant arrived in Utah on 19 February 1992.
Record 252, 603. Article IV of the IAD states: "(c) In
respect of any proceeding made possible by this
article, trial shall be commenced within one hundred
twenty days of the arrival of the prisoner in the
receiving state."

U.C.A. 77-29-5 Art. IV (1990).

The

jury was sworn on 13 January 1993. Record 804-8.

This

is an eleven month period during which defendant was
kept in Utah, away from his rehabilitative program.
The right to a trial within 120 days inuring to
defendant was clearly violated when the continuances
granted by the trial court are scrutinized for
reasonableness and for meeting the good cause standard
for granting continuances in an IAD-detainee context.
Petersen, 810 P.2d 421. Lack of due diligence by the
State, a violation of the fundamental fairness
doctrine, violation of speedy trial rights and repeated
violations of IAD compel this court to dismiss the
conviction entered on January 13, 1993, or to remand
the matter to the District Court with instructions to
allow withdrawal of the guilty plea and to thereafter
dismiss the charges before the court.

-24-

Respectfully submitted this

day of

September, 1994.

Herm 01sen
Attorney for
Defendant/Appellant
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